Ich bin gerade über diesen alten Artikel (2011) gestoplert (unten), den ich aus mindestens zwei Gründen für interessant halte.
(1) 2011 konnte man sich Helikoptergeld nicht wirklich vorstellen.
(2) Aber selbst MIT dem heutigen Helikoptergeld MUSS eine ausgabentechnische Nachfrage danach vorherrschen, um wirksam Inflation zu erwarten - ansonsten fällt das Helikoptergeld eben in die Liquiditätsfalle.
Was nix mit dem Artikel zu tun hat, aber mit dem thread Thema:
Von 2015-2018 konnte man in der €uro Zone eine Ausweitung der Bilanzsumme der EZB
von 2.1.2015 mit 2,15 Billionen €
auf 4,93 Billionen € am 5.1.2018 ... in vier Jahren Hopplahopp mehr als verdoppelt
.. netter prozentualer Jahreschnitt 
beobachten. Eine ECHTE Inflation auf der Geldmengenseite, die NICHT im Warenkorb zwecks CPI Inflation ankam.
https://www.tagesgeldvergleich.net/stati...anken.html
https://www.finanzen100.de/finanznachric...67_555590/
Artikel:
MONEY GROWTH DOES NOT CAUSE INFLATION (Forbes)
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johntharvey...0d0c0442f5
"... But perhaps the real nail in the coffin of the “money growth==>inflation” view is this: the phenomenon that Milton Friedman identifies as key to the whole process, i.e., the excess of the money supply over money demand, cannot happen in real life. The irony here is that something else we already cover in the intro macro class makes this evident. How is it that the Federal Reserve increases the money supply? Remember that Friedman used a helicopter–indeed, he had to, for there was no other way to make the example work. This wasn’t just a simplifying device, it was critical, for it allowed the central bank to raise the money supply despite the wishes of the public. However, that can’t happen in the real world because the actual mechanisms available are Fed purchases of government debt from the public, Fed loans to banks through the discount window, or Fed adjustment of reserve requirements so that the banks can make more loans from the same volume of deposits. All of these can raise M, but, not a single solitary one of them can occur without the conscious and voluntary cooperation of a private sector agent. You cannot force anyone to sell a Treasury Bill in exchange for new cash; you cannot force a private bank to accept a loan from the Fed; and private banks cannot force their customers to accept loans. Supplying money is like supplying haircuts: you can’t do it unless a corresponding demand exists....
And this is how it really works, at least until the Fed starts using helicopters for monetary policy."
(1) 2011 konnte man sich Helikoptergeld nicht wirklich vorstellen.
(2) Aber selbst MIT dem heutigen Helikoptergeld MUSS eine ausgabentechnische Nachfrage danach vorherrschen, um wirksam Inflation zu erwarten - ansonsten fällt das Helikoptergeld eben in die Liquiditätsfalle.
Was nix mit dem Artikel zu tun hat, aber mit dem thread Thema:
Von 2015-2018 konnte man in der €uro Zone eine Ausweitung der Bilanzsumme der EZB
von 2.1.2015 mit 2,15 Billionen €
auf 4,93 Billionen € am 5.1.2018 ... in vier Jahren Hopplahopp mehr als verdoppelt
.. netter prozentualer Jahreschnitt beobachten. Eine ECHTE Inflation auf der Geldmengenseite, die NICHT im Warenkorb zwecks CPI Inflation ankam.
https://www.tagesgeldvergleich.net/stati...anken.html
https://www.finanzen100.de/finanznachric...67_555590/
Artikel:
MONEY GROWTH DOES NOT CAUSE INFLATION (Forbes)
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johntharvey...0d0c0442f5
"... But perhaps the real nail in the coffin of the “money growth==>inflation” view is this: the phenomenon that Milton Friedman identifies as key to the whole process, i.e., the excess of the money supply over money demand, cannot happen in real life. The irony here is that something else we already cover in the intro macro class makes this evident. How is it that the Federal Reserve increases the money supply? Remember that Friedman used a helicopter–indeed, he had to, for there was no other way to make the example work. This wasn’t just a simplifying device, it was critical, for it allowed the central bank to raise the money supply despite the wishes of the public. However, that can’t happen in the real world because the actual mechanisms available are Fed purchases of government debt from the public, Fed loans to banks through the discount window, or Fed adjustment of reserve requirements so that the banks can make more loans from the same volume of deposits. All of these can raise M, but, not a single solitary one of them can occur without the conscious and voluntary cooperation of a private sector agent. You cannot force anyone to sell a Treasury Bill in exchange for new cash; you cannot force a private bank to accept a loan from the Fed; and private banks cannot force their customers to accept loans. Supplying money is like supplying haircuts: you can’t do it unless a corresponding demand exists....
And this is how it really works, at least until the Fed starts using helicopters for monetary policy."
